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Conference: Living in Uncertainty – Kierkegaard and Possibility 
The Evolution of Possibility in Kierkegaard’s Authorship 
Paper draft by Kresten Lundsgaard-Leth, Aalborg University 
*** 
There is a confusing equivocality to the concept of »possibility« in Kierkegaard’s authorship. The 
very meaning of the concept thus seems to undergo a curious transformation with every changing 
perspective of the many Kierkegaardian pseudonyms.  
Most interpreters are off course well aware that the modal terms of (i) »actuality«, (ii) »possibility« 
and (iii) »necessity« play a crucial role to Kierkegaard, but it is rarely attempted to say something 
more systematic about how and why these concepts are used in such different ways throughout the 
authorship. To sketch at least the outlines of such an account is what I will try to do here. 
I will allow myself to disregard almost Kierkegaard’s entire non-pseudonymous authorship (with 
the sole exception of Works of Love) just as I will allow myself to focus exclusively on texts that were 
written between 1843 and 1849. I do this because I believe Kierkegaard to have developed a 
coherent and mature theory of existence within this six-year span.  
Somewhat regrettably, I have not found the time and space to integrate neither Either/Or, Repetition 
or Stages On Live’s Way into this brief account – but I will neither try to justify nor elaborate on this 
exclusion at present.  
*** 
It is conspicuous how the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms appear to become increasingly interested in 
considering and applying the category of »possibility« throughout the publications of the 1840s.  
In Fear and Trembling, thus, the concept of »possibility« is used a mere four times in total, whereas 
Johannes de Silentio refers to »impossibility« a combined eleven times. In Philosophical Crumbs, the 
two concepts are utilized a combined 26 times (with a palpable 17 of these, conspicuously, appearing 
in the infamous “Interlude”).  
In The Concept of Anxiety from 1844, »possibility« finally seems to have become a regular corner stone 
concept. In this book, the concepts of possibility and impossibility thus turn up on no less than 81 
different occasions. 
In The Concluding Unscientific Postscript from 1846, the tendency continue in so far as the concepts are 
employed a record 172 times in total.  
Although we are “down” to 147 and 115 instances of application of the two terms, in The Works of 
Love from 1847 and The Sickness Unto Death from 1849, these works still represent an actual peak in 
the pseudonymous interest in the concepts of »possibility« and »impossibility«. This is the case for 
the very simple reason that both of these works are simply much shorter books than the 
quantitatively very bulky Postscript. 
*** 
All that being said: The purely arithmetical exercise of exhibiting where the concept of »possibility« is 
used how often is admittedly neither very philosophically interesting nor very explanatorily enlightening. 
Allow me therefore to jump straight into Fear and Trembling and begin a more substantial 
investigation of the evolution of possibility in Kierkegaard’s thought.  
In Fear and Trembling, we ultimately do not learn much positive about the book’s real message. Instead, 
we learn something negative about which kind of philosophical position will not allow us to make 
sense of the figure of the »venerable father Abraham«. As anyone vaguely familiar with the Old 
Testament will know, Abraham is willing to sacrifice his only child, his son Isaac, to »prove« his faith 
in – as well as his faithfulness to – God. Abraham never actually sacrifices Isaac, but he is seemingly 
fully willing to do so. And the true »greatness« – as well as the undeniable appalingness – of his faith 
consists precisely in his calm willingness to follow through.  
The way I see it, Fear and Trembling primarily has a negative lesson to teach, namely the following: it 
is utterly impossible to make sense of Abraham’s faith inside the scope of the »ethical« sphere. In the 
ethical sphere – which we can allow ourselves to identity more or less with Hegelian »ethical life« 
– we act due to reasons that can become recognized by other rational agents. To be able to become 
recognized by others, ethical deeds must abide by norms that are – also at least potentially – 
understandable to everyone else. There can off course be intelligible ethical conflicts, for instance the 
tragic dilemma between morning dead loved ones in an appropriate manner and protecting the city-
state that we encounter from Antigone. Indeed, there always will be a whole lot of such conflicts. 
Such conflicts are still, however, intelligible conflicts internal to the ethical sphere.  
Regarding the problem of personal identity, these considerations also have a huge significance: 
According the Hegelian model, thus, I cannot become who I am in splendid isolation. Rather, I must 
necessarily transform my internal emotions into external actions, since I can only understand myself 
as being in a certain way if others recognize that I am in fact acting in accordance with this way of 
being. 
Here, we should ask ourselves whether Hegelianism is not philosophically right to suggest that it does 
not make any sense to speak about any constitution of subjectivity outside of the domain of normative 
processes of recognition that we call the »ethical sphere«? Furthermore, does this not imply that we 
can only make sense of any possible action, if we manage to make sense of ourselves to others who 
can then go on to recognize – or refuse to recognize – the reasons we present?  
I believe we have strong reasons to take these Hegelian claims seriously, and Johannes de Silentio 
does indeed take them very seriously. As such, he insists that it is utterly »impossible« for anyone 
who does not have faith to understand how we could ever be able to justify Abraham. We do learn 
that Abraham’s faith somehow enables him to exist as this »particular individual« in an exclusive God-
relation (which allegedly transcends all social relations) and we also learn that we must somehow be 
able to consider infanticide as a »holy deed«. But we never actually learn what is really implied in 
these proclamations – other than the fact that they are both utterly incomprehensible not to mention 
absurdly appalling to ethical reasoning. Which indeed they are. 
*** 
More must be said, but I do claim that the primary lesson of Fear and Trembling is the following. 
However faith might be characterized in positive terms (we still do not know how), it is »impossible« 
to understand from the point of view of the standard philosophical framework of Hegelianism – 
which at Kierkegaard’s time was and – and still very much is – the standard point of view of a lot of 
highly persuasive, social philosophy. 
Allow me to move on: in the “Interlude” of the Philosophical Crumbs, we learn a bit more about why 
we could have some actual reasons to be skeptical towards Hegelian ontology. Interestingly, 
Johannes Climacus coins this critique in a terminology permeated by the modal distinctions between 
»actuality«, »possibility« and »necessity«. 
The fundamental claim of Climacus is that it is ultimately completely ontologically unacceptable to 
conflate the logical concept of »necessity« with the historical concepts of »actuality« and »possibility«. 
Climacus poses the following, rhetorical question: »Has the possible, by having become actual, 
become more necessary than it was« – and clearly answers it with a resounding no.  
To Climacus, necessity has nothing to do whatsoever with historical realities. In history, the transition 
from the past to the now is simply a possible transition from one state to another, in which one option 
(rather than other possible ones) becomes actualized. By having become actualized, however, it does 
not become necessary – after the fact – that it became actualized. It simply became the actual case 
that whatever happened actually became the case (i.e. that it happened) – and metaphysical necessity 
has nothing at all to do with any of it.  
Importantly, the possibility-actuality dialectics of real, historical life becomes radicalized when it 
comes to the self-reflective choices and actions of human beings. Human beings, thus, are not only 
exposed to non-necessary instances of »becoming« in natural history (such as the transition from an 
acorn to an oak tree); they are also able to act freely (i.e. to choose to do one thing rather than 
another). 
Since Hegel claims that the philosophical understanding of what has taken place is effectively a way 
of realizing the necessity of the historical processes, Climacus is certainly criticizing Hegelianism here. 
The actual Hegel, however, is not suggesting that historical and logical necessity amount to one and 
the same thing. He is also not arguing that history could not have turned out in any other way – 
merely because he, terminologically, refers to the dialectical patterns of historical development as 
»necessities« that philosophy can grasp after they have happened.  
*** 
Is the disagreement between Hegel and Climacus then a mere terminological one? And if it is: have 
we yet learned anything positive about the Kierkegaardian project – other than the fact that it cannot 
be conflated with neither Hegelian ethical life nor with Hegelian metaphysics? 
Not really, I think – so let us move on to The Concept of Anxiety. In The Concept of Anxiety, the concepts 
of »possibility« and »actuality« are applied in a manner that is quite distinct from the appalling faith-
terminology from Fear and Trembling let alone the very formal ontology-terminology from the 
Crumbs.  
More specifically, Vigilius Haufninensis “existentializes” the concepts by zeroing in on the way in 
which each individual human being is spiritually awoken from the »dreaming« state of childhood in 
an anxious realization of »freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility«.  
In The Concept of Anxiety, thus, the concept of »possibility« is specifically meant to imply an experiential 
– rather than a merely logical – category. When we experience that we have possibilities (to act) in a 
way that other animals do not, thus, this experience, firstly, feels in a certain way (i.e. it begets 
»anxiety«). Secondly, it totally restructures how we must understand our lives. As such, we cannot 
experience the possibility of freedom without also experiencing that this very possibility makes it 
necessary for us to take responsibility for how we act with this freedom (once we start to act). To put 
the same point differently: the very experience of the spiritual fact that we are free forces us to make 
sense our lives through normative concepts of how we ought to act. And this realization is anxiety-
inducing. 
To be sure, The Concept of Anxiety also focuses a lot on the possibility and actuality of the theological 
concept of »sin«. Briefly put, sin is the qualitative transition that breaks with the ethically ignorant 
innocence of childhood. For these reason, the forms of anxiety connected with sinful existence are 
no longer »dreamily« concerned with the mere possibility of sinful action – but with possible 
approaches to being a sinner. The qualitative act of sinning itself, however, cannot be described by 
the »psychological« approach of Vigilius who therefore limits himself to talking about states of mind 
such as uncommunicative »inclosing reserve« or the lack of »earnestness« that both increase our 
propensity to sin.  
The Concept of Anxiety is stuffed with remarkably acute psychological and existential insights – but: it 
nonetheless remains very unclear what actual sinning amounts to. It also remains rather unclear, 
what we are to understand by the claim in the final chapter of the book that anxiety can be »saving 
through faith.« Allegedly, this has to do with the fact that »he who is educated by possibility is 
educated according to his infinitude« which – for its part – »consumes all finite ends and discovers 
all their deceptiveness«, wherefore »possibility is the weightiest of all categories«.  
But again: but what have we actually learned hereby besides the claim that the standards of finite, 
ethical life are ill equipped to “measure” the message that Vigilius is here to present? We already 
knew this to be the case – I might add – from Fear and Trembling. 
*** 
We might do better having a look at The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in which Johannes Climacus 
returns with a vengeance to tell us a “little” more about the problem he posed in the Crumbs: »can 
there be a historical point of departure for an eternal consciousness?«.  
Climacus insists that he only seeks to dress up this problem in its »historical costume«, but it quickly 
becomes evident that this new approach requires him to shift from the highly speculative 
terminology of the “Interlude” to an approach much closer to the more existential lingo of The 
Concept of Anxiety. 
In The Postscript, we are forcefully assured that »actuality« is both existentially and ethically »higher 
than possibility«. Here, »possibility« clearly no longer indicates the infinitely educating possibility 
of faith from The Concept of Anxiety. Instead, it designates the way-too-abstract possibilities of 
metaphysical thinking as well as the way-too-disengaged possibilities of aesthetical existence. 
Importantly, the truly »ethical« is no longer thought as the kind of agency which takes place inside 
the space of normative reasoning in Hegel’s ethical life. Instead, the true ethical stance is now 
modelled on the iconic figure of Socrates, whose »passionate inwardness« and insistence on personal 
»appropriation« – rather than the blind acceptance of – society’s norms Climacus praises in no 
uncertain terms. 
The paradoxality of Socratic existence in all its ethical actuality, however, will only take us so far. 
The paradox between the infinite passion of Socrates for the »Good«, on the one hand, and the 
temporal conditions of human existence, on the other, thus does not represent the highest kind of 
ethical actuality that we encounter in the Postscript. This price goes to Christian religiousness, rather, 
in which the paradox becomes internal to the truth itself, in so far as this very truth (i.e. the 
incarnation of Christ) is a conceptually impossible fusion of eternity and finitude.  
All things considered, The Postscript tells us much more about the (i) general existential predicament 
of humans, about (ii) the true, Socratic nature of ethical actuality and about (iii) the nature of 
Christian faith than we could ever learn from Fear and Trembling (let alone from the Crumbs). He also 
couples the ontological paradox-approach from the Crumbs and transforms it into a far more 
experiential approach much closer to Vigilius’ approach in The Concept of Anxiety.  
But still, what are we to understand by the faith that we now know is utterly non-Hegelian, 
potentially »saving« through possibility, and doubly paradoxical in an existential – and not merely 
an ontological – sense of the term?  
*** 
On my interpretation, Kierkegaard presents a two-sided answer to this question in the non-
pseudonymous Works of Love from 1847 as well as in The Sickness Unto Death from 1849. I will begin 
my conclusion with the Sickness Unto Death.  
In The Sickness Unto Death, we are given a somewhat more substantial account of Kierkegaard’s theory 
of existence. And as we are getting used to by now, the modal terminology of »possibility«, 
»actuality« and »necessity« is once more employed in a crucial manner.  
Anti-Climacus presents a series of investigations into the phenomenon of »despair«.  Despair is a 
term meant to encompass the vast range of phenomenologically distinct ways in which we can 
misconduct our lives as free existing individuals. And just as in the Schelling-inspired psychology of 
The Concept of Anxiety, it is clear here that a »spiritually« healthy »self« is somehow dependent on 
being able to perform a delicate and – in so far as possible – harmonious balancing between the polar 
opposite »aspects« that constitute selfhood. The formula for non-despair, importantly (although we 
are virtually told that there is no self to be found who is entirely un-despairing), is for the self to be 
»grounded transparently in the power that established it«.  
Anti-Climacus specifies that the self is – among other things – a »synthesis« between freedom and 
necessity, and it becomes obvious that this – once again – hinges on a modal analysis when he goes 
on to address both »necessity’s« and »possibility’s despair« as two vital forms »of this decease«.  
In his description of »possibility’s despair«, Anti-Climacus clarifies that the possibility-despairing self 
– as he puts it – »exhausts itself floundering about in possibility, yet it never moves from where it is 
nor gets anywhere, for necessity is just that ‘where’ […] Becoming is a movement from some place, 
but becoming oneself is a movement at that place.« This is crucial – but how, precisely?  
Well, we know that the self has been established by a »power« different from itself – and also, that 
non-despairing somehow amounts to being grounded transparently in this power. This power, 
however, which clearly represents the necessary »’where’« that ought to restrict the extent to which 
the self allows itself to get lost in the pure possibilities of abstract thinking as well as in the 
unrestricted possibilities of romantic fantasizing, cannot be a (self)limitation that stems from the 
Hegelian norms of recognition in the »ethical sphere«.  
To allow one’s self to be constituted by the opinion of others (i.e. by the intelligible norms of social 
recognition) is thus precisely the predominant version of »necessity’s despair«. What must instead 
be the case for Anti-Climacus position to make sense, is for the self to have been somehow 
constituted in a way it cannot simply »choose« not to be (but that it can off course always relate to). 
This vital feature of selfhood can neither come down to an essential genetic nature (that would be 
flat-out »fatalism«, which Anti-Climacus explicitly refutes); nor can it be the outcome of social 
processes of recognition. 
We do have a nature, off course – just as we are largely shaped by the socio-cultural processes in 
which we find ourselves. We can also make actual choices that make a difference, both personally 
and politically. We are not, however, necessitated products of social processes (as Hegel would have 
it) – just as we cannot create ourselves ex nihilo in order to become who we would like ourselves to 
be by choosing the most attractive possible self that we can fantasize about (as Sartre would later have 
it).  
Instead, we always already have an individual self, established by some other power than itself. This 
self can participate in the social game of giving and taking intelligible reasons. Indeed, it must do so. 
But: it also can also have personal reasons to do something other than the ones that would be socially 
recognizable – simply because he or she happens to be who he or she happens to be. And, 
importantly, for no other reason. 
This might be inexplicable from the point of view of social reasoning – but that is the whole point 
of having personal reasons that are irreducible to the outcomes of social processes of recognition. 
Crucially, this also explains how a human being can in fact be completely recognized by other 
persons and still suffer from despair. Bourgeois society, as Anti-Climacus does not tire from 
accentuating, does not only provide the necessary, intersubjective framework in which we can 
become who we are. Tragically, it can also distract us – as singular individuals – from becoming who 
we are.  
Accepting the person we happen to be is oftentimes hard: maybe we are less perfect than we would 
like to be, aesthetically as well ethically, maybe we are not loved in return by the ones we love, or 
maybe we have suddenly stopped loving the mothers and fathers of our children that we would very 
much prefer to continue loving. We simply cannot entirely control our own selves.  
We can, nonetheless, always find hope in the faith that »for God, everything is possible«, although 
any such hope must always begin with grounding oneself transparently in the actual self that one has 
been given. 
We are now able to re-interpret the previous, pseudonymous texts in the following way: (i) faith is 
not about validating infanticide – but about addressing a kind of normativity which transcends 
»ethical life«. Faith (ii) is not about out-competing an ontology of necessity with an alternative 
ontology of actuality and possibility – but about existential actuality that transcends any kind of 
philosophical system-building. Faith (iii) is also not about having faith in any undetermined possibility 
whatsoever – but about having faith in hopeful possibilities for one’s own, given self. And (iv) faith 
is not about placing epistemological trust in the paradoxical nature of an external event that happened 
two millennia ago – but about having a self which is in itself paradoxically structured to the extent 
that it has reasons to act that it cannot argue for inside the space of social reasons of ethical sphere.  
*** 
But what about everyone else’s self? Should we not care about other existing human beings – and their 
struggles to be and become themselves? This question is addressed by Kierkegaard himself in the 
Works of Love from 1847.  
Works of Love is a series of deliberations about neighbourly love. The »concept of neighbour« – to put 
it with Kierkegaard – »really means a duplicating of one’s own self. Neighbour is what philosophers 
would call the other […] As far as thought is concerned the neighbour or other need not even exist 
[…] To be sure, neighbour is in itself manifold, for neighbour means all men; and yet in another sense 
one person is enough.«  
To love the neighbour evidently makes something visible in the other that neither abstract thinking 
nor social reasonableness enables us to see. But what does a loving relation to the other imply? First 
and foremost, loving deeds are about helping the other »to love God«. To love God, importantly, 
»is [also in fact] to love oneself in truth«, in so far as – which we already know from The Sickness Unto 
Death – »God« is in fact the power that has established each self. A power, furthermore, in which a 
non-despairing must be transparently grounded.  
Loving deeds, as we now realize, are ultimately a helpful attempt to assist this attempted grounding.   
Kierkegaard also states in the Works of Love that love »is the opposite of despairingly hoping nothing 
at all«. Love’s hopefulness, in modal as well as normative terms, hopes for the »possibility of the 
good« for oneself as well as for others, which – for its part – is nothing but »the lover’s [very] 
relationship to other men […] hoping for them, he infinitely keeps possibility open with infinite 
partiality for the possibility of the good«. In Kierkegaard’s own words. 
Something very important is revealed here: it is not enough to hope for the possibility of everything 
in the totally unqualified sense that »for God, everything is possible«. Literally speaking, this is not 
good enough. In other words: It is not normative enough with regards to the self of another self. More 
to the point, thus, we must hope for the possibility for the good. Not only for ourselves – but also for 
others. The other, importantly, is also a self who has not established herself – but who is nonetheless 
also not a mere product of processes of social recognition.  
A loving relationship to the actual otherness of the other’s self, therefore, must be such that the other 
is emancipated in a twofold fashion: both from the bourgeois worry about who the rest of society 
(including myself) prefers her to be and from the romantic – and existentialist – fantasy that it is 
merely up to her who she is.  
Weirdly, love hereby also turns out to be an inter-personal relation that is specifically designed to 
free the loved one from the norms of intersubjective relations and instead allow the neighbour to be 
neither »this or that« but to be herself [in front of God] – and this everyone can be if she wills it. 
Hopefully.  
